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THE LEGAL STATUS OF THE SEMI-ADOPTED
During the spring and summer of 1941 questionnaires were sent to 30,000 of
America's 150,000 doctors. Replies were received from only 7,642 of those questioned. But through this fraction of America's medical profession a startling fact
was disclosed. Half of the doctors replying revealed that, to their personal knowledge, more than 9,500 American children owe their existence to the procedure
known as artificial insemination-a practice new to medical science, and unknown
in the law.
It seems certain that this figure represents the very minimum number of
children thus conceived. How many more like children may already be in existence
can be a subject only of mere conjecture, since the true answer is a secret closely
guarded by the remaining unasked and unaswering 142,000 doctors. But the figure
as it stands is sufficiently impressive to merit attention and help for these who are
born but not conceived. Science, the procreator of innumerable mysteries, has this
time conceived a problem the solution of which lies not only in the minds of
science but also equally in the hands of the law, and into the law's lap science has
unceremoniously dropped its burden. So far as medical science is concerned artificial insemination is a practical answer to sterility. It is a fact, successful and
established. So far as the law is concerned, artificial insemination may be a difficult
problem, uncertain and yet to arise.
The production of synthetic babies, while an old idea, is a relatively new
"industry". The knowledge that artificial insemination would produce offspring
dates almost from the very dawn of medical history, but the application of this
knowledge, as a final resort, to the problem of sterility in human beings is a modern innovation. Hardly a child so conceived is, today, more than ten years of age.
Yet this very fact all too clearly indicates the growing importance of this problem.
In the first ten years of its application this procedure has produced a minimum of
upwards of 10,000 children. It would indicate that a major portion of our future
population might owe its existence to a test tube.
These "test-tube" babies fall into two distinct dassifications. In the first are
those who are the offspring of a married couple prevented by some physical abnormality or emotional incapacity from normal conception. In this class of case
the natural mother and father are the wife and the husband. Only the conception
is artificially induced through the agency of science. With this type of case, no
legal problems are involved, since the child is truly the offspring of both the husband and the wife. Children of this class must be admittedly legitimate, since the
law, fond as it is of infinite distinctions, has not yet gone so far as to dictate the
method of conception.
The second class, however, does give rise to many problems, including the
question of legitimacy, since to it belong those children born of a pregnancy in-
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duced without the benefit of the mother's husband. In this type, an outside and
independent "donor" is selected with care by the physician in attendance. Only he
knows this donor's identity. Conception in the wife is thereafter achieved by
means of artificial insemination, aided by the contribution of the unknown donor.
The children thus produced form the subject of this discussion. These are tht children who owe their existence to modern medical science. These are the children
who are not the sons and daughters of their mothers' husbands. These ard. thle
normal, healthy children whose "fathers" were test tubes and whose mothers were
experimental laboratories, but who are nevertheless human beings undistinguishable and unmarked. These are the semi-adopted.
Legally, these thousands of children would seem to be without fathers. Will
they, and possibly many thousands more, be permitted to share in the estates of
their mothers' husbands? Are they descendants of their mothers only? Are they
half-bastards to be condemned by the law to the stigmata of illegitimacy and barred
forever from their normal place in the scheme of things?*
The term "semi-adopted" is the one generally accepted as applied to those
children born of artificial insemination. Doctors and psychologists have found it a
convenient expression to distinguish such children from those born of the natural
union of husband and wife, and also from such children as may be legally adopted
as that term is employed usually. The designation, "semi-adoption", seemed a
happy choice for this in-between conception which has produced the test-tube baby.
To the lay mind it seemed adequate to say that the husband "adopted" his wife's
offspring by his consenting to the process. Hence the origin and significance of
this terminology.
But in law the word "semi-adopted" and its derivatives are unfortunate and
misleading. While all reputable physicians have always secured the consent of the
husband prior to the insemination, this consent on the part of the husband constitutes his entire process of "adoption" of the child yet to be born. Specifically then,
the question is this: Will a child conceived by means of artificial insemination and
born of a pregnancy induced through the aid of some unknown donor acquire his
full legal status as a child of his pseudo-father with whom no ties of blood of any
kind exist, and whose only act of acceptance of this child was his consent to the
insemination?
There are no decided cases on this subject. In fact, any considered legal opinion is, as yet, extremely rare. Magistrate Jeannette Brill of New York has said,
"The presumption of the law is that a child born in wedlock is legitimate. But in
a test-tube case, where the 'father' knows that he is not the father, I can't see how
the child can be anything but illegitimate."1
There is much to be said for this argument. The Pennsylvania courts have
*Copyright, 1941, by Esquire, Inc., 919 N. Michigan Ave., Chicago, Il.
1941).
lCoronet, Vol. 10, No. 6, page 12.

(Coronet, October
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held uniformly that, since adoption was unknown at common law, the statutory
formalities must be strictly adhered to.2 Adoption is defined as the "taking of the
child of another in the manner provided by, and with the consequences specified
in the statute." There seems little room for doubt. Unless the child is taken "in
the manner provided by" the statute, the taking cannot be a legal taking or adoption, and the seemingly necessary consequence is that a child not so taken cannot
be benefitted by the provisions of Section 16, B, of the Intestate Act of June 7,
1917, P. L. 429, relative to the inheritance rights of adopted children. In short, it
would seem that unless all the requirements of the statute are faithfully met, the
child remains at law as a stranger to the person who would be his foster parent.
Accepting, for the sake of argument only, that this is the present law applicable to the case, it is now necessary to consider whether the adoption statute is, in
its terms, at all applicable to the situation under discussion, namely the taking by
the husband of a child born of his wife of a pregnancy induced by artificial insemination through the aid of some outside donor. In other words, will the courts
of Pennsylvania hold, as a condition precedent to the full legitimacy of the child
as regards the pseudo-father, the necessity for observing statutory procedure in the
case of a husband who would "adopt" his wife's test-tube offspring.
The act of April 4, 1925, P. L. 127 as amended, June 5, 1941, P. L. 93 and
July 2, 1941, P. L. 229 lists, in part, the following requisites for a legal adoption:
a. Petition by the adopting parent or parents to the orphans' court,
setting out the name, age, date and place of birth of the person
to be adopted as well as the name or names of the natural parent
or parents, or anyone else whose consent to the adoption must be
secured.
b. The consent of the adopting parent's husband or wife.
c. The consent of the parents or surviving parent of the person proposed to be adopted, where such person has not reached the age
of eighteen years, except that in the case of an illegitimate child
the consent of the mother only is necessary.
d. Hearing before the courti
e. The decree of adoption.
The one major objection which must be made generally to this entire procedure, as applied to test-tube babies, is its publicity. But to explain, even in part, the
practical difficulty which will be encountered immediately if publicity is forced
upon the process of artificial insemination, some consideration of its procedure
must be made. In all test-tube cases closest secrecy is the predominating feature.
Artificial insemination is resorted to usually only after the married couple has exhausted every hope of curing the husband's sterility. In the usual course of events
only the husband, the wife and the acting physician have any knowledge whatever
that this process has been employed. The child, to his own belief and tcq that of
.Fisher v. Robison, 329 Pa. 305, 198 A. 81; Thompson's Adoption, 290 Pa. 586, 139 A. 737.
gFisher v. Robison, 329 Pa. 305, 198 A. 81.
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his family's friends, is the offspring of his mother's husband. The couple is never
told the identity of the donor, and he in turn does not know and cannot discover
the name of the woman he has benefitted.
Today, according to reliable medical estimates, fifteen per cent of all married
couples are involuntarily childless. This means that there are some three million
marriages in which sterility prevents childbearing. In about half of these cases
artificial insemination Will produce the desired children. And for many of this
number it will be the only possible solution to the sterility. That it has already
produced, at least, upwards of ten thousand children bears mute testimony, not
only to its practical effectiveness, but also to the fact that its resources have been by
many couples considered the final resort in the solution of their own physical in4
capacity. It is an accepted medical fact which can bring an otherwise impossible
happiness to millions of people. But its entire value will be lost if the courts are
to force upon it arbitrarily an unwanted publicity.
The very life-blood of artificial insemination is secrecy. Will a husband choose
to come into court and publicly admit that he is incurably sterile? Usually he will
not so long as there burns within him one remaining spark of family pride. Will
the husband choose to admit publicly that the child his wife has borne is not his,
but actually that of some professional donor? Again the answer must be an almost
inevitable negative. Will the child itself be happier knowing that the one he has
become accustomed to call "father" is not actually his father at all, but that instead
he has been sired by some unknown who has been paid for his services? What
will be the effect upon the mother when she learns the name of the father or
fathers of her children? The possible psychological repercussions are overwhelming to contemplate, if the secrecy be destroyed and the pseudo-father be forced into
open court.
What then will be the inevitable result if the courts do .'equire formal adoption proceedings by the husband to "adopt" his own wife's offspring born during
this marriage? It can be only this, that the same artificial insemination which has
already proven a God-send to thousands of happy couples and which may, in the
near future, equally benefit millions more, will die of publicity and shame and
will be relegated to the laboratory whence it came. Medical science, instead of
having successfully filled a long-felt need, will have served as midwife to ten thousand bastards.
But laying aside the almost inevitable conclusion that mankind would avoid
such a procedure if attended by open publicity, and supposing that some few
couples might find its advantages desirable in spite of the attendant notoriety, yet
the purely legal difficulties in attempting to comply with the statutory requirements
remain. A brief consideration of the requisites above enumerated will bear this out.
First of all the adopting parent or parents must petition the orphans' court.
The petition must state the name of the child to be adopted. What name could be
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given for this test-tube baby? The name of the actual father could not be given
since this is a fact which cannot be revealed. If the name of the mother, as in the
case of some illegitimates, then this is the same name as that of the petitioning
husband and there would appear the incongruous situation of a father seemingly
"adopting" his own child, appearing as it would, John Doe, adopting John
Doe, Jr.
But even though this difficulty be overcome successfully, the 'second requirement, that is, the names of the natural parents, presents a real difficulty. The name
of the mother is readily available, but should the petition show the father to have
been '"test-tube number 216"? And if it be so given, would this fulfill thetrigid
statutory requirement? Obviously it would not since the name to be given is that
of the person whose consent is required. A test tube can hardly be said to come
into this classification. Furthermore, it must not be forgotten that the name of the
natural father is often impossible to obtain, or, if possible, extremely undesirable
since its revelation would prove highly disastrous to the psychological well-being
of all the parties concerned. It is true that situations do exist where the donor's
name is actually known to thelphysician or the foundation performing the insemination. In fact many times accurate records are purposely kept by members of both
the medical and psychological professions in order to form the basis of studies of
heredity and psychological development and progress. In such cases it would appear that the actual ascertaining of the donor'slname would be simply a matter of
record. This is true, but when considered in the light of the effect this revelation
to the public would produce, numerous difficulties are at once encountered.
A single example will suffice to illustrate these difficulties. All donors are
selected with great care. They must be entirely free from any hereditary incapacity
or taint. They must possess good character and better than average intelligence.
The number of persons answering to these requirements and available as donors is
necessarily small. Frequently therefore, one man may be the donor in a great number of cases. Two years ago Dr. Seymour, reporting in the Journal of the American Medical Association, discussed the progress of thirteen -semi-adopted" children all sired by the same man, but born of thirteen different mothers. The donor
in this case was an eminent figure in his profession, a college graduate and possessor of an intelligence quotient in the genius rating. He had a wife and two children of his own. The value of his contribution scarcely can be overestimated.
If it be assumed that, instead 'of the present secrecy, this donor's name would
have to be revealed, as required by the present Pennsylvania adoption statute, in
subsequent adoption proceedings by the husbands of the women he has thus benefitted, there would appear the unpleasant spectacle of a married man, with children
of his own, who was the admitted father of thirteen additional children, each of a
different mother. Even though it were made not to appear actually adulterous
through some modification of the terminology of parenthood used in the petition,
still, so far as the public is concerned, it would seem to accuse the donor of a program of extramural propagation, which would be almost certain to work a sub-
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stantial injury to him both professionally and socially. If the donor knows that his
name is subsequently to appear as such in public, the risk that he would be asked
to run in most cases would be too great. The result is obvious. The valuable services of desirable donors would be lost irretrievably and the whole system of arti,
ficial insemination fail.
There can be but one conclusion. The statute makes demands which are, as
applied to children produced through artificial insemination, actually impossible to
fulfill, or of such a nature that the strict compliance would make necessary a revelation disastrous in its consequences.
Those sections of the statute requiring the consent of various other persons
raise only the same problems. The consent of the wife of the "adopting" husband
could certainly be readily obtained. This would seem to be necessary for the particular adoption proceeding apart from any consent or agreement prior to the
child's birth.' In the case of a test-tube baby, however, this wife is the actual
mother of the child, and would have to give her consent as its natural parent. Certainly the consent of the wife-mother, even though only one consent, should be
sufficient to meet both requirements.
It is with the consent of the father that the real difficulty arises, since it appears that the consent of both of the natural parents is necessary even though the
father, in this case, might be considered as having abandoned his child. 5 What
has been said regarding the mere naming of the donor is equally applicable to the
requirement of his consent. At first glance, the statute, in this instance, would
seem to be- adequate, since it provides that in the case of an illegitimate the consent
of the mother only is necessary. But this automatically gives rise to a vicious circle
of faulty reasoning. It is first necessary to call the child illegitimate in order to
meet the statutory requirement for an adoption to make the child legitimate. Of
course, under the statute as amended in 1941, when the child has reached the age
of eighteen years after having lived continuously with the adopting couple for a
period of ten years, no consent by the natural parents is necessary, This in some
measure at least eases the situation of the test-tube baby. But it puts upon the
adopting parents the burden of waiting eighteen years, with the risk of death of
the pseudo-father during this long period. Today, as has been pointed out, practically no test-tube baby is more than ten years of age, and in time of war the
future is short.
Manifestly all of this discussion leads to but one conclusion. The Adoption
Act of 1925, P. L. 127, together with its amendments, was not enacted with the
situation of the test-tube baby in the legislative mind, Consequently it is inadequate to meet his needs. It was to be hoped sincerely that the amendments of 1941
might ease this situation but, as obsrved by Professor A. J. White Hutton in 46
4

1n re McCann's Adoption, 104 Pa. Super. 196, 159 A. 334.
5In re Sulewski, 113 Pa. Super. 301, 173 A. 747.
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Dickinson Law Review 64, "It is doubtful whether the legislative mind has improved the general situation of adoption." It is obvious that it has not considered
the present problem.
But granting that the system of adoption as it exists in Pennsylvania today is
inadequate and impractical as applied to test-tube babies, and that almost without
exception the pseudo-father will not resort to its provisions for the reasons outlined, does it necessarily follow that a child as conceived must invariably be considered by the courts as illegitimate as to the pseudo-father? Statutory adoption
certainly would fully legitimatize the child.6 But the present statute has been
shown to be inadequate to meet this situation. On the other hand, the courts have
recognized only the status of legitimacy or that of illegitimacy. For them there has
been no middle ground. Yet it is now a fact beyond all dispute that medical science has created just such a middle ground. Faced with this new situation, in
which direction should the courts face? Can the courts, independent of any statute,
still find a test-tube baby fully legitimate?
It is true that the case holdings have been almost unanimous to the effect that
the court can only follow the legislative lead.
"Instead of passing a general act, giving to adopted children all the
rights of those who are natural-born, the legislature has chosen, as
has been shown above, to advance step by step, and we cannot properly do otherwise than follow where it leads; hence, since the supposed rights of an adopted child have not been extended to cover the
situation here presented, we can only repeat what we said in Boyd's
Estate, 270 Pa. 504, 507; 'If it is deemed wise to provide that adopted
children shall have the rights here claimed for them, the legislature
can extend the law to cover them; we cannot'." Russell's Estate, 284
Pa. 164; 130 At. 319.

True it is that this concerns a different issue than the one now under consideration,
but it is useful to show that the past determination of the court has been to keep
the entire subject exclusively within the control of the legislature. Can the court
now do otherwise than adhere to this announced policy when confronted with the
case of the child produced through artificial insemination? That it can, without
torturing the statute or abandoning precedent, is the thesis of the present discussion.
Let it be assumed that a case arises under the legislation now in existence.
Because of the hardships imposed by the statute, the pseudo-father has never legally
adopted his wife's son. This pseudo-father is now dead, intestate, and his "semiadopted" ten-year-old son is claiming his statutory share of his "father's" estate,
against his mother who contends that her husband has died without issue. What
will the court answer? Will it apply the strict rule adhered to almost universally
and say that since this "father" did not legally adopt his wife's child, the child
6Intestate Act of June 7, 1917, P.L. 429, sec. 16.
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shall not be entitled to share in the distribution of the estate? If it dots so hold,
then this result will be flatly contradictory to every intent of this married couple in
seeking artificial insemination as a last possible means of leaving an heir. Or, will
the court adopt a new and broader view, holding, which seems certainly true, that
the legislature never intended the adoption statutes to apply to a test-tube case, and
that in this situation, the consent of the husband prior to 'the insemination is the
only act of adoption necessary to constitute the test-tube child his full and legal
heir?
This latter possible holding is certainly the more equitable and the more
likely to achieve the desired result. It is exactly what the parties intended and went
to such great lengths to achieve. Can this be done without statutory authority? Of
course, if the decided rases are to be considered as the only controlling consideration, then such a result at first would seem impossible. "We know of nc authority
for the proposition that, in the state of Pennsylvania, a child may be adopted by
parole". 7 But it must bc remembered that every decided case has been concerned
with the adoption of children conceived naturally and not through artificial insemination, and every case can be distinguished on this factual ground alone. In
the interest of justice te cases must be distinguished, and the established rulings
held inapplicable to the present situation.
The court would not be without authority for such an apparently revolutionary holding. In Peterson'sEstate,8 Mr. Chief Justice Mitchell begins his opinion,
dated June 22, 1905, as follows:
"This case seems to have been argued and adjudged in the court below on the view that the only essential and governing fact on the
question of adoption is the literM decree of the court. This is an
error. The cardinal fact is the intent of the adopting parent . . . No
action by any court appears to be absolutely essential to a valid and
lawful adoption."
The latter sentence quoted would seem to be no longer the law, as applied to
the usual adoption procceding. The Chief Justice based his statement in this particular on the adoption by deed possible under the Act of April 2, 1872, P. L. 31.
Whether this method is still law is extremely questionable, as pointed out by Professor A. J. White Hutton in 42 Dickinson Law Review 12, at page 17.
However, nothing subsequent to "1905 has changed in any measure the import of the remainder of this quotation. It must be borne in mind that this statement was written with a prescribed statutory procedure for adoption already long
since in existence. The implication is clear. The only way that this holding can be
justified is that the court, through the Chief Justice, interpreted the law to mean
that the statute was only a form for carrying into effect the adopting parent's in7

Carroll's Estate, 219 Pa. 440, 68 A. 1038.
8212 Pa. 453, 61 A. 1005.
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tent. Thus, only the procedure for carrying out such an intent is that which the
statute seeks to regulate. Whether or not the adopting parent had the requisite
intent to adopt is the primary consideration for the court. Whether or not, with
that intent, he thereafter proceeded according to the provisions of the statute is
only of secondary consideration. Subsequent adoption statutes have varied and
modified this procedure, but they have done no more than that. Nor has any subsequent case tended to undermine this statement, that the controlling fact is the
intent of the adopting parent.
If this be the law, then the statutes in effect today, and the decided cases
thereunder, as have been suggested, are those prescribing the procedure to be followed in carrying into effect an intent to adopt a child already in existence at the
time such intent was formulated. This is true if it be conceded that the legislature
did not have the situation of the test-tube baby in mind. In other words, the statutory procedure has been intend'ed to apply only to living children, and is not the
mandatory procedure for carrying into effect an intent relative to any other than
such living children.
If this be true then the adoption statute has no application to th'e problem of
artificial insemination, and the children thereby produced. At no time does the
pseudo-father entertain any intent to adopt a living child, in spite of the misnomer,
"semi-adoption,,' familiarly applied. The only intent of this sterile husband-yet
would-be father-is to have a child of his own. It is never to adopt what he considers the child of another. His only intent is to have his wife bear him a child. If
the husband "adopts" anything, it is but the fertile sperm of some outside donor,
and fortified with this, he calls upon the agency of medical science to create in his
wife a pregnancy he himself is unable to achieve. Nothing has been intended to
be adopted except the medical substitute for the natural conception denied him.
His consent, his wife's consent, and medicalscience unite at the moment of conception to bear for the husband a child and heir. This is his only intent, and a
statute prescribing a procedure to carry out an utterly different intent to adopt a
child already in existence, can have no application whatsoever to this situation. If
the "cardinal fact is the intent", then let this be so, and the case of the test-tube
baby is taken out of the adoption statute, notwithstanding other pronouncements
of the court apparently to the contrary.
Thus the court, on its own reasoning and authority may hold such children
fully legitimate, apart from any form of statutory procedure or regulation. The
child is the legitimate son of the pseudo-father from the moment of its conception.
The statute does not deal with the adoption of a sperm, and the cases, by their own
admission, only interpret the statute. The child can and must be held fully legitimate, and this can be done with violence neither to the statute nor to any decided
case.
This then should be the result should the case arise under the legislation now
in existence. Nevertheless a simple statutory change would simplify the entire
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question of artificial insemination. It is accordingly recommended that the Act of
April 4, 1925, P.L. 127 as amended, June 5, 1941, P.L. 93 and July 2, 1941,
P. L. 229, be further amended so as to read, in addition:
"Provided, however, that in any case where a husband gives his consent, either oral or in writing, to the medical insemination of his wife
by artificial means, that no act of adoption shall in any event be necessary, and that any child or children subsequently born of any pregnancy thus induced by such artificial insemination shall for all purposes be the true and legal child or children of such consenting husband."
J. C. SCHOCK

